Showing that you care: The evolution of health altruism
Introduction
Health economists’ workhorse model has long been “medical care insurance”. That is, individuals can ex ante prefer insurance, to pay for expensive medical care to get them well should they get sick. And such insurance may require state intervention to mitigate market failures [5], [78], [80]. This standard framework has illuminated may aspects of health policy.
This framework, however, has trouble accounting for a disturbingly wide range of health policy phenomena, many of which are reviewed below. While many auxiliary assumptions have been suggested to explain such policy puzzles, dissatisfaction with these alternatives has led many health economists to conclude that an important explanation of behavior in health and health policy is “philanthropic externalities” [77], i.e., the fact that “individuals derive utility from knowing that other (sick) individuals are receiving medical care” [36].
The idea that people care about the outcomes of others is widely considered plausible, and has inspired researchers to look at both how such altruism might have evolved [87], [31], [10] and how it might in general lead to counter-intuitive outcomes [11], [62]. Researchers have also considered the implications of altruism for many aspects of family behavior, such as bequests and fertility.
The health policy implications of altruism have, however, not yet been explored in much detail. That is, there are many possible “altruists,” depending on which people and outcomes the altruist cares about, and researchers have yet to look in much detail at which kinds of altruists are theoretically and empirically plausible. That is, which types of altruists can both account well for observed behavior in health and health policy, and fit well with what we know about the behavior and environment of our hunter-gatherer and primate ancestors, where such altruism presumably evolved?
This paper begins to explore one possible set of answers to this question. While only some of these answers seem original, they together seem to offer a simple and unified synthesis of diverse phenomena.
In particular, we explore the evolutionarily-plausible assumptions that our ancestors
- 1.
cared more about their social allies, especially those with more and better other allies,
- 2.
suffered more crises when they had few allies (i.e., were of low status), crises being events where the appropriate response diverts energies from investing in health, and
- 3.
were unsure about who would remain a long-time ally, with some often knowing things others did not about the chances that associates would remain allies.
These assumptions have many implications. For example, a person B considering how much to invest in health would weigh both the chance that he would end up with many allies (and become high status), and the chance he would end up with few allies (and become low status). By assumption two, the better he thought his chance of ending with many allies, the more sense it would make to invest in health. He might invest via self-care, reduced risk-behaviors, or a reduced stress response.
An associate A of B, however, would place less weight on what happens when B ends up with few allies. After all, in this case, A also probably not be B’s ally, and by assumption one A would then care less about B. Thus A would prefer that B invest more in health, compared to what B would choose for himself. This divergence in perspectives would be especially strong when B had an especially high chance of ending up with few allies. Our assumptions therefore predict paternalistic altruistic preferences about health, with paternalism especially strong toward the low status.
If A is considering how much to care for an injured or sick B, she will consider the chance p that they will remain allies. Since the value to A of a healed B increases with chance p, A will naturally offer more care when this chance is higher. By assumption three, however, B and other observers can then use A’s level of care as a signal of what A knows about the chance p of remaining allies. For example, more care will persuade B that he is more likely to remain an ally of A, and hence is more likely to be of high status. This can convince B to invest more in health.
Person A might know things about either A or B’s loyalty or desirability as an ally. Since A would typically like others to believe in a high chance p of remaining allies, A will over-care in order to credibly signal p. Thus our assumptions predict excessive health care due to efforts to signal social solidarity, and they predict a comforting placebo effect from the appearance of care.
The health-care behavior of humans today may still reflect a genetic inheritance of tendencies toward once-adaptive behaviors, even if humans today are not aware of the origins or ancient function of their current behaviors.
If so, the assumptions above may explain the following modern behavior:
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Paternalistic health-favoring regulation of behaviors, especially toward the low status.
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Support for national, not international, health insurance, independent of market failures.
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A strong influence of social status on health, mediated by care, behavior, and stress.
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Genuine concern mixed with self-serving efforts to be seen as helping.
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A near-zero marginal health-value of medical care, and a placebo benefit of apparent care.
If we further assume that for our ancestors, desirability or loyalty as social allies increased with age, we can also explain an especially low marginal health-value of medicine for older people. Finally, if we assume that the value of allies, relative to other resources, increased with increasing material wealth, we might also explain the apparent “luxury” nature of both medical care and leisure. We might thus account for the increasing fraction of our resources devoted to health care.
After a more detailed examination of these health policy puzzles, we will discuss how our assumptions fit with what we know about the behavior of our ancestors, present some simple formal models, and finally review how our assumptions may explain these policy puzzles.
Section snippets
Health altruism and paternalism
Several health policy puzzles surround the ways in which health behavior and care seems to be treated differently from other consequences and industries.
National health insurance (NHI) was begun in Germany in the late 1800s, and similarly in Japan in 1911, apparently to gain allegiance from workers unhappy with industrialization [36]. Since then something like NHI has long attracted wide-spread political support. This support is especially striking when compared to the relatively weak support
The evolution of health altruism
Perhaps our distant ancestors can tell us something interesting about modern health behaviors. Many aspects of human behavior are surely local cognitive adaptations to local modern circumstances, while many other aspects are culturally evolved and inherited adaptions to the modern world. However, much of our strategies of adaption, and the menu of behaviors these adaptions choose from, surely reflect our genetic inheritance. About half of the variation in personalities, for example, can be
Formal models
The above qualitative descriptions of our ancestors can be embodied in formal models, models which should allow us to more easily see the implications of our assumptions.
Signaling models
Let us now consider the possibility that some people may know things that others do not about the chance that a person will remain in the group. In such a situation, the amount of care given to an injured or sick person may be interpreted as a signal of this hidden information.
Consider a group-contingent altruist A who has an opportunity to care for an injured or sick person B, i.e., a person with low hB. For simplicity let us assume and w = 0. Let q be the probability that A will be in, and
Signaling limits
Over-care is a feature common to all of the above models. This is because everyone wants to be thought of as someone who will remain in an alliance. The worst possible type has some low chance of long-standing alliance, and chooses some low level of care, while all other types over-care to distinguish themselves from this worst type.
Explaining health policy puzzles
Even if our qualitative descriptions of ancestral incentives are reasonable, and even if our formal models capture their relevant essence, there remains the issue of how well they can really explain various puzzling features of modern health care behavior. Which modern behaviors would result from given inherited behavioral strategies can depend on subtle detail about how such behavior was encoded and cued.
For example, if our evolved taste for fat depended in a detailed enough way on relevant
Acknowledgements
For their comments, I thank Robert Anderson, Glenn Beamer, Robert Boyd, Bryan Caplan, Tyler Cowen, Joseph Farrell, Frank Forman, Richard Frank, Tim Freeman, Paul Gertler, Herbert Gintis, Robert Graboyes, Alan Grafen, Anders Hede, Ted Keeler, Julian Le Grand, Helen Levy, Susanne Lohmann, Peter McCluskey, Joseph Newhouse, Anne Piehl, Paul Rubin, Tom Rice, Andrew Sellgren, Russell Sobel, Lawrence Sugiyama, Earl Thompson, participants of the UC Berkeley RWJF scholar seminars, and of these
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